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Evaluation of Flexibility Markets for
Retailer-DSO-TSO Coordination
Alejandro Vicente-Pastor, Jesus Nieto-Martin, Member, IEEE, Derek W. Bunn, and Arnaud Laur
Abstract—The rise of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)
can enhance the efficiency of system operations by providing
flexibility services to the different agents involved, but they also
pose a major resource allocation problem. This study considers
three different agents procuring DER services: Distribution
System Operators (DSOs) for local congestion management,
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) for system-wide reserve
deployment, and Retailers for hedging against network usage
tariffs based upon peak-load pricing. A variety of market
mechanisms are identified to co-ordinate these needs, and three
schemes are developed in detail. These are (a) separate markets
for each agent, (b) co-ordinated Shapley value allocations for TSO
and DSO, and (c) a co-ordinated mechanism including Retailers.
These designs are evaluated on a realistic distribution network in
Britain for two operational days. The results show a more efficient
dispatch from the TSO-DSO co-ordinated procurement over
independent sequential procurements. However, the inclusion of
Retailers in the joint dispatch is surprisingly less attractive due
to the lack of improvement in social welfare, and the undesirable
impacts on the DSO.
Index Terms—Distributed Energy Resources, Flexibility Mar-
ket, TSO-DSO Co-ordination
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and parameters appear in italics, while variables appear
unformatted.
A. Indices
u Index of flexibility turn up units
(demand increase/generation decrease)
d Index of flexibility turn down units
(demand decrease/generation increase)
g Index of generation units
j Index of demand units
n/m Index of nodes
l Index of line going from node n to node m
tr Index of transformers
t Time index of settlement periods within a day
B. Sets
TRD Set of negative reserves activation time frames
TTW Set of triad window time frames
The authors are with the Department of Management Science and Oper-
ations, London Business School, London NW1 4SA, U.K. (Corresponding
author: jmartin@london.edu).
C. Parameters
FUP,maxun Upper limit of flexibility turn up unit u (MW)
FDW,maxdn Lower limit of flexibility turn down unit d (MW)
PGin Power produced by generation unit i (MW)
PDjn Power consumed by demand unit j (MW)
piUPun Bid of flexibility turn up unit u (£/MWh)
piDWdn Bid of flexibility turn down unit d (£/MWh)
piRD Activation price of down reserves (£/MWh)
V OLL Value of Lost Load (£/MWh)
V OLG Value of Lost Generation (£/MWh)
PˆT Probability of triad event
CˆTNUoS Network tariff expected price (£/MW)
Bl Susceptance of line l
TCtr Transformer tr rated capacity (MW)
LCl Line l rated capacity (MW)
CTR Transformer cost (£/MW)
CL Line cost (£/MW/km)
xL Line reinforcement block size (MW/km)
xTR Transformer reinforcement block size (MW)
D. Continuous Variables
θn Voltage angle in node n
FUPun Flexibility activated by turn up unit u (MW)
FDWdn Flexibility activated by a turn down unit d (MW)
PDSjn Load shed in demand unit j (MW)
PGCin Power curtailed in generation unit i (MW)
fl Power flow in line l (MW)
PIMPn:1 Power imported from transmission network
(MW)
E. Integer variables
TCBAUtr Number of blocks of transformer tr in BAU
LCBAUl Number of blocks of line l in BAU
TCMtr Number of blocks of Transformer tr in market
case
LCMl Number of blocks of line l in market case
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT advances in the introduction of DistributedEnergy Resources (DERs), including large renewable
and small scale generation, as well as demand-side response,
electric vehicles and batteries, have motivated a growing
interest in market-based solutions for the provision of energy
and flexibility services at a local level. This represents a new
competitive tier in the already complex market arrangements
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of electricity production and retailing. It opens new oppor-
tunities of engagement for producers, consumers, retailers,
aggregators and network service operators.
Within network operations in particular, the amount of DERs
connected at low-voltage levels is creating major disruptions
[1]. For the Transmission System Operator (TSO), DERs
increase the sources of ancillary service providers, but also
bring greater uncertainty to the extent that DER activities may
be less visible and predictable closer to real-time operations.
For Distribution Network Operators (DNOs), whilst embedded
generators present new stresses on the local infrastructure,
they also offer a range of active, flexible options to manage
their networks. Hence, the emergence of Distribution System
Operators (DSOs) is beginning to mirror the activities of the
TSOs [2]. All of which motivates the need for an efficient
market design to support these transactions. Whilst there is
much concern within the industry about co-ordination between
DSOs and TSOs in the use of DERs, there is an absence of
formal research on the topic. This paper therefore addresses
this new research requirement.
Within integrated market architectures, the marginal price of
balancing the system is reflected in the Locational Marginal
Prices (LMPs). These prices are derived from a centralized
optimization traditionally carried out at transmission level.
However, one view is that the increase of DERs in the
distribution grid may require an extension of the formulation
to co-optimize both transmission and distribution, resulting
in LMPs for transmission and distribution [3]. In contrast
to centrally optimized systems, within liberalized, unbundled
market designs, the efficiency of the market is determined
by competition and market rules [2]. This is the situation in
European power markets, where different market settings arise
at local levels operated by DSOs in coordination with their
TSO. To find efficient co-ordination arrangements, several
TSO-DSO market pilots have emerged across Europe, at
national level as in GB [4], [5], and at a wider European level
with, for example, the SmartNet project designing a future
Trans-European Ancillary Services market [6].
In terms of new TSO-DSO market designs, in one of the most
practical studies, [7] addressed several key ingredients but dis-
regarded some fundamental aspects including the possibility of
cooperative contracts and the potential cross impacts triggered
by separately activated resources. We therefore formulate an
analysis that specifically considers these aspects. We also ex-
tend the market participation to include Retailers. Thus, based
upon a GB distribution business framework [8], we simulate
(a) separate markets for DSO, TSO and Retailer, (b) co-
ordinated Shapley value allocations for TSO and DSO, and (c)
a co-ordinated mechanism including Retailers. Two real days
of system operations data are used, over which performances
are assessed. The main contribution of the results is to show
that separate markets and/or the inclusion of the Retailer are
not as efficient as a co-ordinated DSO-TSO procurement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the different uses of flexibility by participants, their
possible cooperative contracts and their operational conflicts.
Section III describes the three mechanism designs, followed
in Section IV by their respective formulations. Then, the GB
market framework is presented in Section V. The results are
in Section VI. Finally the main conclusions are summarized
in Section VII.
II. FLEXIBILITY FOR MARKET PARTICIPANTS
We consider the three stakeholders, TSO, DSO, and Re-
tailer, that act as buyers of flexibility services, potentially
competing for the same resources.
A. DSO flexibility
Typically, planning the reinforcement of distribution net-
works is a multi-year optimization problem that tackles the
trade-off between strategic network planning and incremental
network reinforcement. With the penetration of substantial
DERs, future network requirements become more uncertain
and as a consequence there is increasing risk aversion to fixed,
physical reinforcements. More attention has therefore been
given to planning processes [9], where smart grid strategies
are included such as dynamic line rating, quadrature-boosters,
static VAr compensators and Active Network Management
(ANM) connections [10]. Customers with ANM connection
arrangements are subjected to curtailment based upon pre-
defined heuristic rules imposed by the DSO to alleviate
congestion [11]. However, a market mechanism to perform the
ANM dispatch would be a more efficient solution [12]. A wide
range of flexibility contracts can evidently be of value to the
DSO and potentially more attractively than long-term physical
reinforcements. While exclusive-use flexibility contracts could
be the most practical solution for the DSO, the procurement
of the resources in a local market with other interested buyers
(like the TSO) could improve the total welfare.
B. TSO flexibility
The TSO requirements for flexibility resources include
energy balancing actions, which aim to restore the imbalance
of the system, and system balancing actions, which solve
operational issues, such as congestion and power quality.
Thus, the TSOs are willing to access DER capabilities either
in real-time through the balancing market [13] or through
capacity contracts such as, in GB, the Short Term Operating
Reserve (STOR). The STOR service providers are committed
to reserve some capacity to be deployed within a time frame
of 5-15 minutes and for a maximum duration of 4 hours. In
comparison with the European Union for the Coordination of
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) arrangements, STOR is
used sometimes as manual Frequency Response (mFRR) and
other times as Replacement Reserve (RR), but going forward,
GB is in a process of harmonizing reserve and frequency
services with the European reserve market projects [14]. The
STOR service is provided through option contracts procured
ahead in time both from units participating in the balancing
market (BM) and from other non-BM units, typically embed-
ded in the distribution network. A new reserve service is being
trialed (Demand Turn Up) [15], designed to increase demand-
side engagement, and the TSO has indicated an intention to
increase the clearing frequency of STOR contracts and to share
these resources with other interested buyers [14], [16].
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C. Retailer flexibility
In GB, the Retailers are responsible for contracting the
required energy to match their customers’ demand, and they
are subject to imbalance costs for all real-time discrepancies
between metered consumption and their contracted positions.
The Retailers also pay the Transmission Network Use of
System (TNUoS) charges to the high voltage network owners,
and the Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges
to the system operator. As for the investment and maintenance
costs of the distribution network, these are recovered through
the Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges. The TNUoS
charges in particular follow the peak-load pricing principle,
being partly based upon the three highest periods of system
demand during the year, known as ”triads” [17]. Therefore,
they can be mitigated by providing flexibility services that
reduce anticipated peak demand, such as demand reduction
services or increased output from embedded generation. To
predict triads, Retailers generally subscribe to forecasting
services offering specific warnings for these events, both day
ahead and intra-day [18].
D. Cross impacts from uncoordinated activations
The uncoordinated activation of flexibility actions among
System Operators and Retailers are likely to create additional
costs, which can jeopardize the benefits of the flexibility
market. In what follows, ”turn-down services” (TDS) refer to
demand reductions (or generation increases) and vice versa
for ”turn-up services” (TUS). The possible cross impacts
depending the direction of the service are presented in Table
I:
TABLE I
POTENTIAL CROSS IMPACTS
Service ↓ impact on→ TSO DSO Supplier
TSO: STOR service
(TDS)
Congestion
created
DSO: Congestion service
(TUS)
Reserve
activated
(TUS,TDS)
Imbalances
created
Supplier: Triad service
(TDS)
Congestion
created
• TSO causes congestion in DSO distribution assets. The
cost for DSO can be a degradation of DSO assets such as
transformers [3], and in the worst case, the curtailment
of generation or loads.
• DSO activates a congestion service in the opposite direc-
tion to reserve deployed by the TSO, for which the TSO
has to activate further reserves.
• DSO actions cause imbalances in the Retailers’ BM
exposures.
• Retailer activates services and causes congestion in the
distribution and/or transmission network.
III. MARKET MECHANISM DESIGNS
As in [7] and [19], this study assumes that the required
capacity is fully available within the delivery day. This can
be achieved by long term tenders for resource adequacy, but
auctions for capacity payments are outside the scope of this
paper. We focus our analysis on the short-term coordination
of available resources through local flexibility arrangements.
Below, we refer to TSO, DSO and Retailers as flexibility
buyers and the DERs as sellers. Three design options are
analyzed: a sequential procurement, a double-sided auction,
and a tailored mechanism.
A sequential procurement is the simplest and closest to
current practice. In this design, sequential tender processes
are organized by the different buyers to match their disparate
decision time-scales. For example, the reserve needs of the
TSO become evident within a timeframe of minutes, whilst for
the DSO, a congestion-mitigating service could be predicted
several hours ahead. As for the Retailers, they are likely to
act upon the day-ahead or mid-day forecast warnings on peak
prices, and seek to reduce TNUoS exposures accordingly.
Evidently, these three separate mechanisms, by construction,
cannot take advantage of coordination opportunities, and as a
consequence, nor can they extract the full potential of social
welfare from flexibility services.
A single double-sided auction can be based upon a trading
platform in which all flexibility is cleared in a one shot
auction. This platform would be used to determine the
allocation and the utilization of each specific flexibility
resource. However, whilst there might be efficiency gains
by concentrating the liquidity for services, gaming strategies
may occur [20], especially if the buyers’ valuations are
interdependent [21]. For example, a service activated (and
therefore paid) by the DSO can be indirectly beneficial for the
TSO and/or the Retailer without incurring any costs for them.
This could lead to a free-rider strategy where the TSO and
Retailer anticipate the DSO’s actions for their own benefits.
The drawbacks of a double-sided auction can be overcome by
a tailored mechanism reflecting the complex utility functions
of the buyers in this problem. But, one shortcoming of a
tailored mechanism is that buyers might have to reveal their
valuation functions, which may be proprietary in competitive
markets. Nevertheless, this could be managed by regulation
to the extent that the TSO and DSO are regulated businesses.
As a possible mechanism, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
has been widely applied. For example [22] proposes a VCG
mechanism for capturing the time value of different frequency
services in the utility function of the GB TSO. In a VCG
mechanism the pay-off of a buyer is its relative contribution to
the total social welfare [21]. This mechanism has the desired
properties of truthfulness (i.e. participants are incentivized to
submit true valuations) and efficiency (i.e.maximizes social
welfare). However, the sum of VCG pay-offs is non-zero (i.e.
it is not budget balanced), requiring additional regulation to
handle the imbalances. Thus, we look at other budget-balanced
mechanisms that still conserve truthfulness but may relax the
efficiency. Note that, according to the Green-Laffont-Hurwicz
theorem [21], no truthful mechanism is always both efficient
and weakly budget balanced. The Shapley value is a solution
concept in cooperative game theory in which a buyer’s pay-off
is its marginal contribution of the total cost of the possible
coalitions [21]. This cost distribution is commonly associated
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with the notion of fairness. In the flexibility platform context,
this is translated into a proportional share of cost when two
or more buyers benefit from the same service and are willing
to pay for it separately. In our proposed mechanisms the
Shapely value will be used to determine the pay-offs (i.e.
the settlement), while the activation of services will be based
upon maximising social welfare.
In summary, the sequential procurement through separate
tender processes is the design closer to current practice, but it
cannot achieve efficiency in the overall allocation of services.
Furthermore, uncoordinated activation actions can result in
undesirable cross impacts between buyers. However, it does
allow the different participants to optimize their timings for
procurements. The single double-sided auction improves the
allocation efficiency, and concentrates liquidity. However
gaming strategies can jeopardize the market efficiency because
of the interdependent valuations of the buyers. Finally, the
tailored mechanism can guarantee allocation efficiency and
coordination is achieved by considering the cross impacts.
For these reasons, the double-sided auction is disregarded
for the rest of the study, and the sequential procurement is
compared against two Shapley value mechanisms, with and
without the inclusion of the Retailer.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The proposed mechanisms have been simulated in a stylized
manner based on a distribution network from the UK. Two
operational case studies are investigated based upon actual
system data. The model represents a typical network con-
strained by both embedded generation and demand, optimized
as described below in Section IV-A.
It is important to re-emphasize that the services activated
in this study are not energy balancing services, for which
a separate BM runs concurrently. Nevertheless, the cost of
energy imbalances do come into the calculations below, and
in the context of procuring flexibility services, it is assumed
that the DSO and Retailers are price takers with respect to the
system price [23]. The modeling proceeds as follows. First the
reinforcement level of the distribution network is calculated
as baseline. Then, a variety of mathematical formulations to
define the dispatch of the mechanisms are presented. Finally,
a set of real days, with actual operations, are chosen upon
which the dispatch and settlement for the different designs are
compared.
A. Reinforcement Cost Calculation
Two levels of reinforcement are defined: traditional incre-
mental network reinforcement (without any use of flexibility
services) and reinforcement considering flexibility market ar-
rangements. The first is the base case, being the business as
usual (BAU) DNO model, and it will be used to benchmark the
valuation of the DSO market-based alternatives. For simplicity
of research focus we make the following simplifications:
1) the reinforcement level is assumed to be adjusted to a
static distribution network setting under average demand and
generation and without multi-year variations; 2) the expected
flexibility volume and prices are known in advance in the
planning decision; 3) only thermal constraints trigger the re-
inforcement decisions; 4) the reinforcement costs are modeled
in blocks of discrete capacity for lines and transformers and
economies of scale are not considered; 5) the power flow is
simplified to the linear DC Optimal Power Flow formulation
(1). The linearization of power flow equations is subject to the
assumptions of negligible losses, small resistance compared
to reactance in the lines, and small voltage variation between
buses.
flt = Bl (θnt − θmt), ∀l = (n,m), t
θnt = 0, n = 1 (1)
It is noteworthy that this stylization of the planning decision
whilst simplifying is nevertheless sufficient to exemplify the
DSO’s decision process and characterize a generic distribution
network suitable to compare the different mechanisms. The
reinforcement decision is formulated as Mixed Integer Linear
Programming (MILP), where the new capacity installed of
lines and transformers are integer variables (TCBAUtr ,LC
BAU
l )
multiplied by their respective block size (xL, xTR). The ob-
jective function of the DSO is minimizing the reinforcement
cost:
MinTCBAU ,LCBAU
∑
tr
TCBAUtr x
TRCTRtr +
∑
l
LCBAUl x
LCLl
(2)
subject to (1), flow balance constraints (3), transformer and
line flow limit constraints (4),(5), and integer variables con-
straints (6):
∑
l=(n,m)
flt −
∑
l=(m,n)
flt +
∑
i
PGint
−
∑
j
PDjnt + P
IMP
n:1 = 0, ∀n, t (3)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
l=(n,m)
flt −
∑
l=(m,n)
flt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ TCBAUtr xTR, ∀tr, n, t (4)
|flt| ≤ LCBAUl xL, ∀l, t (5)
LCBAUl ∈ Z+ ∀l, TCBAUtr ∈ Z+ ∀tr (6)
In contrast, with a flexibility market, the DSO optimizes the
reinforcement planning decision together with the flexibility
services available in the market (FUPut ,F
DW
dt ):
MinTCM ,LCM ,FUPut ,FDWdt
∑
u
FUPut pi
UP
ut +
∑
d
FDWdt pi
dp
dt
+
∑
tr
TCMtr x
TRCTRtr +
∑
l
LCMl x
TRCLl (7)
subject to (1), flow balance constraints (8), transformer and
line flow limit constraints (9),(10), integer variables constraints
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(11) and upper and lower bounds of the flexibility bids volume
(12),(13):∑
l=(n,m)
flt −
∑
l=(m,n)
flt +
∑
i
PGint −
∑
j
PDjnt
+
∑
u
FUPunt −
∑
d
FDWdnt + P
IMP
n:1 = 0, ∀n, t (8)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
l=(n,m)
flt −
∑
l=(m,n)
flt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ TCMtr xTR, ∀tr, n, t (9)
|flt| ≤ LCMl xL, ∀l, t (10)
LCMl ∈ Z+ ∀l, TCMtr ∈ Z+ (11)
0 ≤ FUPut ≤ FUP,maxut ∀u, t (12)
0 ≤ FDWdt ≤ FDW,maxdt ∀d, t (13)
Below, (LCMxL,TCMxTR) define the line and transformer
capacity parameters (LC, TC) in the subsequent formulations.
B. Market Designs
Three possible market designs are proposed here: the se-
quential procurement and two tailored mechanisms. The two
tailored mechanisms reflect first the joint procurement of TSO,
DSO and Retailer, followed by a separated version where
the Retailer procures on its own. In this setting, the exact
timings of the activation signals are not crucial, but the order of
activation by the buyers is the key aspect. Figure 1 represents
a timeline diagram displaying the interests of the buyers, and
the procurement process in the three market schemes.
Fig. 1. Coordination timeline diagram.
In all the market designs considered, the sellers (DERs) are
settled on a ”pay-as-bid” basis, and they are assumed to post
their services on to a trading platform where the buyers (or
a mechanism) can contract. Furthermore, the services can be
accepted fully or in part.
1) Sequential Design: In this scheme the buyers activate
services sequentially. First, the Retailer procure TDS (FDW )
for the peak price periods if a triad warning event occurs
(t ∈ T triad). For its problem, a Retailer minimizes the price
difference between the flexibility service and the expected
TNUoS cost in its objective function (OF):
MinFDWdt OF
RET =
∑
t∈TTW
∑
d
FDWdt (pi
DW
dt − PˆTt CˆTNUoS)
(14)
Subject to : (12), (13)
Then, the flexibility TDS (FDW ) acquired by the Retailer is
removed from set of services available to DSO, as the volumes
already committed to the Retailer are no longer available for
subsequent procurement. The DSO requires both TUS, to solve
congestion caused by generators, and TDS to solve congestion
caused by demand. The problem for the DSO is to minimize
the payments to the flexibility providers while respecting the
thermal limits of the network:
MinFUPut ,FDWdt OF
DSO = (15)∑
t
∑
d
FDWdt pi
DW
dt +
∑
t
∑
u
FUPut pi
UP
ut (16)
Subject to : (1), (8), (12), (13), (17)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
l=(n,m)
flt −
∑
l=(m,n)
flt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ TCtr, ∀tr, n, t (18)
|flt| ≤ LCl, ∀l, t (19)
We do not consider the alternative sequence in which the
DSO commits ahead of the Retailer. Given that the Retailer
is procuring flexibility on the basis of day ahead peak load
warnings, the DSO will be aware of this and will need to
respond accordingly to the Retailer’s activations. Further, as
more active intra-day condition monitoring is introduced, (e.g.
dynamic line rating), the DSO procurement is likely to become
closer to real-time. After the DSO procurement, the services
(FUP ,FDW ) acquired by the DSO are removed from the set of
services available to the TSO. The TSO bases its procurement
decision on the difference between the activation prices of
down reserves (STOR) (piRD) and the flexibility price (piUP ):
MinFDWdt OF
TSO =
∑
t∈TRD
∑
d
FDWdt (pi
DW
dt − piRDt ) (20)
Subject to : (12), (13) (21)
Insofar as TSO modifies the previous DSO security con-
strained dispatch, the DSO has to correct the contingencies
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by curtailing load and/or generation in real-time:
MinPGCit ,PDSjt OF
DSO−RT = (22)∑
t
∑
i
V OLG PGCit +
∑
t
∑
j
V OLL PDSjt (23)
Subject to : (24)∑
l
flt +
∑
i
(PGint − PGCint ) (25)
−
∑
j
(PDjnt − PDSjnt) +
∑
u
FUPunt (26)
−
∑
d
FDWdnt = 0, ∀n, t (27)
As for the valuation of each buyer, the DSO considers the
savings in reinforcement costs amortized over the hours of
services called. As for the Retailer, the valuation is the savings
of TNUoS payments (FDW PˆTt Cˆ
TNUoS) in the case a peak
load event occurs. For the TSO, the valuation is the savings
on activation payments of STOR contracts (FDWpiRD). These
definitions of the valuations remain the same for the other two
mechanisms.
2) TSO-DSO mechanism: The TSO and DSO are regulated
entities, whereas the Retailer is a private company looking
to maximize its profit. Hence, we first consider a semi-
separate market where Retailer firstly procures TDS for peak-
load avoidance services. As in the sequential procurement,
Retailer procures its services according to (14). Then, the units
contracted by the retailer are removed from the set of services
available to the mechanism. Following the sequence of Figure
1, the DSO and TSO send their valuations and constraints
to this co-ordination mechanism, which, 15 minutes ahead
of delivery, performs a market clearing that maximizes the
total welfare of both buyers. The formulation of the TSO-
DSO mechanism includes the DSO’s power flow and balance
constraints (1),(8),(12),(13) and the flexibility units availability
constraints (18),(19). While the objective function minimizes
the procurement cost of TUS and TDS, considering the
valuation of TSO’s reserves contracts (FDWpiRD) and the cost
of TSO’s cross impacts due to services activated in opposite
direction (FUPpiRD):
MinFUPut ,FDWdt OF
TSO−DSO = (28)∑
t
∑
u
FUPut pi
UP
ut +
∑
t
∑
d
FDWdt pi
DW
dt (29)
+
∑
t∈TRD
∑
u
FUPut pi
RD
t −
∑
t∈TRD
∑
d
FDWdt pi
RD
t (30)
Subject to : (1), (8), (12), (13), (18), (19) (31)
In the TSO-DSO and TSO-DSO-Retailer mechanisms the
DSO valuation is included in the last decision (i.e. mechanism
clearing) before delivery, hence the DSO does not have to
adopt post-mechanism actions as the mechanism itself ensures
the dispatch feasibility for the DSO.
3) TSO-DSO-Retailer mechanism: This mechanism inte-
grates the three buyers. The constraints of the mechanism
clearing problem are the same than for the TSO-DSO mech-
anism, and the objective function is modified to include the
valuation of Retailer (FDW PˆTt Cˆ
TNUoS):
MinFUPut ,FDWdt OF
TSO−DSO−Ret = (32)∑
t
∑
u
FUPut pi
UP
ut +
∑
t
∑
d
FDWdt pi
DW
dt (33)
+
∑
t∈TRD
∑
u
FUPut pi
RD
t −
∑
t∈TRD
∑
d
FDWdt pi
RD
t (34)
−
∑
t∈T triad
FDWdt Pˆ
T
t Cˆ
TNUoS (35)
Subject to : (1), (8), (12), (13), (18), (19) (36)
C. Mechanism settlements
In the sequential mechanism, the settlement consists of
a payment for the services activated by each buyer based
upon a ”pay-as-bid” basis. For the other two mechanisms, an
additional procedure is used to compute the Shapley value pay-
offs for each buyer. Recalling from Section III, the cost of a
service should be shared only between the buyers that would
procure the service separately. Therefore, we define ”flexibility
interest” as the volume of these services for each interested
buyer. The settlement calculation for the tailored mechanisms
consists of three steps:
• Mechanism clearing: Solving (30) for the TSO-DSO
mechanism or (35) for the TSO-DSO-Retailer mecha-
nism. The cost of each service is the volume activated
multiplied by the bid price for each service.
• Calculation of flexibility interests: These are determined
solving (14) for Retailer, (16) for DSO, and (20) for TSO.
• Shapley value settlement: The costs of each service are
divided pro rata over the flexibility interests of all the
buyers.
Regarding energy imbalance settlements, in the sequential
procurement, the Retailer imbalances are settled according
to the prevailing Balancing & Settlement Code rules, which
do not consider volumes activated by DSOs. Therefore this
can result in the undesired cross impact shown in Table I.
This consideration has been included in the settlement of
the tailored mechanisms, as the TSO (who is responsible
for balancing the system) accounts for the volume activated
within the mechanism and does not charge the Retailer for it.
Table II summarizes the dispatch function, services settlement,
imbalances settlement and cross impacts for each mechanism.
V. APPLICATION
A. Description
The experimental network in Figure 2 has the topology
of a real 33 kV distribution network in a rural area in the
UK, which is connected directly to the transmission network
at 132 kV. The loads and generators data are presented in
Table III. The demand and generation profiles are shown in
Figure 3, reflecting a typical winter day of peak generation.
The inputs PDjn and P
G
in are obtained multiplying the values
of Table III by the profiles in Figure 3. Note that this mix of
demand and generation is not rare in current UK distribution
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TABLE II
RESUME OF THE THREE MECHANISM DESIGN OPTIONS
Dispatch function Imbalance Settlementrules
Services Settlement
rules Cross impacts
Sequential mechanism Valuation of each partyon its market
Balancing & Settlement
Code rules
Each party pays for its
services
Retailer pays imbalances
generated by DSO, DSO pays
RT adjustments, TSO pays
further reserve deployed
Retailer + TSO-DSO
mechanism
Retailer valuation in its
market, TSO + DSO
valuations in the joint
market
BSC rules for Retailer ,
New rules for DSO:
DSO pays its
imbalances
Retailer pays its
services, DSO and TSO
share the cost of
co-ordinated services.
-
TSO-DSO-Retailer
mechanism
Joint valuation of
TSO+DSO+Retailer
New rules for everyone:
DSO and Retailer pay
their imbalances
Everyone shares the
cost of co-ordinated
services.
-
Fig. 2. Distribution network of the case study.The lengths of the lines (km)
appear in grey. Node 0: 132 kV, black: 33 kV, grey: 11 kV. S: Solar generator,
W: wind generator.
Fig. 3. Profiles used in the case study.
networks. The reinforcement level with the flexibility market
has been obtained as explained in Section IV-A, and the results
are presented in Table IV. For this small stylized system, the
annualized cost of the BAU case is £1.411M, whereas in the
market case it is £1.288 M, of which £32,000 is the cost of the
services procured by DSO. For this specification, an average
annualized cost of £200/MW/km has been assumed for lines
and £2,000/MW for transformers. The line impedances have
been obtained from [10]. Also, an average requirement for
10 days of flexibility services in the year has been assumed.
This is a typical but arbitrary value and does not affect the
comparative nature of our results.
The embedded generators are assumed to bid all their
TABLE III
LOAD AND GENERATORS DATA USED IN THE CASE STUDIES
Load id. NodeID
Av. power
(MW)
Turn Up bid
(£/MWh)
Turn Down bid
(£/MWh)
Load 1 2 29 12.6 22.6
Load 2 3 35 15.1 25.1
Load 3 4 33 11.9 21.9
Load 4 5 19 16.4 26.4
Load 5 6 50 16.7 26.7
Load 6 7 16 16.2 26.2
Load 7 8 46 16.7 26.7
Load 8 9 50 10.8 20.8
Gen. id. NodeID
Capacity
(MW)
Turn Up bid
(£/MWh)
Solar 1 6 10 45.3
Solar 2 7 17 43.6
Solar 3 8 14 39.5
Solar 4 9 42 34.6
Solar 5 10 23 57.8
Wind 1 2 22 55.5
Wind 2 3 25 32.9
Wind 3 4 14 44.6
Wind 4 6 27 53.4
Wind 5 7 46 43.6
TABLE IV
NETWORK CAPACITY: BAU AND WITH MARKET ARRANGEMENTS
Line BAU(MW)
Market
(MW)
Transf.
(node)
BAU
(MW)
Market
(MW)
L1 20 10 0 160 130
L2 10 * 2 10 *
L3 30 20 3 20 10
L4 30 * 4 30 20
L5 20 * 5 20 *
L6 20 * 6 30 *
L7 30 * 7 50 40
L8 30 20 8 50 *
L9 60 * 9 50 *
L10 20 * 10 20 *
L11 40 *
L12 20 *
*same values as BAU
capacity for TUS at the price of the subsidy they are receiving
(e.g. Feed-in-Tariff). The loads, on the other hand, are assumed
to have 10% of their consumption flexible, for example by
electric vehicle charge management, demand reduction or
embedded storage systems. This flexibility can materialize
either as a TUS or TDS throughout the day. The detailed
information of the size and pricing used can be found in Table
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III. Finally, a Value of Lost Load (VOLL) of £6,000/MWh and
a Value of Lost Generation (VOLG) of £100/MWh have been
assumed.
B. Case studies
Creating model-based insights on the relative performance
of the three co-ordination mechanisms presented a mod-
eling challenge. Whilst the local network specified above
is sufficiently realistic to represent and evaluate the DSO
requirements for flexibility services, the TSO requirements
for STOR and the Retailer’s behavior in relation to ”triad”
(peak load) warnings cannot emerge endogenously within that
model, as their occurrences are a result of national wholesale
market circumstances. Furthermore these circumstances are
infrequent and require very extensive detail to model. We
therefore needed to realistically map exogenous STOR and
triad events on to our simulated local network model. Looking
at actual daily case studies to make use of their operational
data as inputs to our local area model, we carefully selected
case studies from the winter season, when peak demand may
cause local congestion, the TSO may require STOR and triad
warning events usually happen. But looking at the historical
data, STOR and triad events did not tend to co-exist as the
triad warning response by Retailers preclude the need for
STOR. Thus, the case studies of interest were adequately
represented by two operational days: a day in which STOR
overlapped during morning and afternoon with DSO services
and a day in which STOR did not overlap with DSO services
but Retailer responses to triad warning did interact with DSO
requirements. Note that in reality it is very unlikely that any
other operational situation with concurrency between buyers
procurements could occur. For example, it is unlikely that a
DSO would experience thermal congestion in its assets due
to excessive demand outside the typical peak demand period
as well as congestion due to excessive generation outside the
typical peak generation period. Each case study used the actual
data of system price, volume of STOR deployed and price
of the most expensive unit activated. The STOR data was
dispatched outside the balancing mechanism and was provided
by the settlement agency in GB, Elexon [24]. The detailed
information of system operation was taken from National Grid
website [25]. The days are:
• Case study 1: Saturday 13th of January of 2018: STOR
instructed during the morning coincided with the peak
hour of generation in the distribution network, and in
the afternoon during the peak hour of demand in the
distribution network.
• Case study 2: Monday 15th of January of 2018: STOR
was dispatched during the morning, whereas the facilities
held for the afternoon were not activated. This was
attributed to 2,000 MW of demand response encouraged
by a peak warning event to the Retailers.
Thus, case study 2 represents a day of activity by the Retailer
and its results are used to compare the performance of TSO-
DSO-Retailer scheme against the TSO-DSO one. On the other
hand, in case study 1, the services of TSO and DSO interact.
Fig. 4. Results of the flexibility dispatched intra-day. Case study 1.
TABLE V
SEQUENTIAL AND TSO-DSO MECHANISMS RESULTS IN CASE STUDY 1
Sequential TSO−DSO
DSO
Valuation (£) 13,027 13,027
Cost (£) -1,606 -1,262
Cross Impact (£) -187 -
Welfare (£) 11,234 11,765
TSO
Valuation (£) 6,051 17,204
Cost (£) -1,381 -1,875
Cross Impact (£) -844 -
Welfare (£) 3825 15,329
Retailer
Valuation (£) - -
Cost (£) - -
Cross Impact (£)) 6,994 -
Welfare (£) 6,994 -
Totals Welfare (£) 22,053 27,094
Hence, they are used to compare the benefits of the TSO-DSO
scheme against the sequential procurement.
The two case studies are analyzed using a set of metrics
based upon the valuations, cost of services and cost cross
impacts for each buyer. In addition, the welfare is defined
as the valuation minus these costs. These metrics are used to
evaluate the profits of the cooperative contracts, and the costs
incurred by the cross impacts. The intra-day co-ordination is
depicted below by graphs of the flexibility activated by each
buyer.
VI. RESULTS
A. Case study 1: STOR deployed during DSO congestion
services
In case study 1, the STOR deployed by National Grid
coincides with the flexibility services needed from the DSO
for congestion management. During this day no peak price
warning was issued, so the Retailer does not participate in the
market.
Figure 4 depicts the intra-day services activated by DSO
and TSO, differentiated between mechanism and direction of
the service (TUS or TDS), whereas Table V presents the
breakdown of each buyer’s welfare according to the metrics
defined in Section V-B. In the upper right quadrant of Figure 4
(sequential mechanism), the TSO activates 21 MW of TDS at
midday, for which the DSO has to curtail 1 MW of generation
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Fig. 5. Results of the flexibility dispatched intra-day. Case study 2.
(upper left quadrant, Figure 4). Recalling from Section II-
D, the uncoordinated activation of TDS by TSO can force
the DSO to carry out generation curtailment actions. This is
reflected in a cross impact in Table V of £187 incurred by
the DSO, and £844 by the TSO for having to pay additional
STOR units (as the DSO nets off TSO’s services). The second
insight of Figure 4 comes from the upper right quadrant, where
the TSO is not able to procure any TDS between 17:00 and
18:00 because of the previous DSO TDS acquisitions. On the
contrary, in the lower right quadrant (TSO-DSO mechanism),
both buyers account for the same TDS service at that time.
The gains of this collaborative contract are reflected in Table V,
where the DSO reduces its total procurement costs by 21.4%,
and the TSO increases its valuation by 184.3%. The third key
aspect of the sequential mechanism is reflected in the Retailer
row in Table V, with a cross impact profit of £6,994. Such
cross impact is the result of a net negative imbalance caused
by the DSO that is inflicted upon Retailer as in Table I. In
this case, the cross impact is reflected into a profit because
the Retailer has a long position from the system perspective
(consumes less than contracted), therefore the net deviation
is compensated at the balancing price (in this instance being
positive). Despite having a positive contribution to the welfare
shown in Table V, such a cross impact is undesirable as it is
an unintended consequence. Regarding the type of flexibility
services, the demand-response units are procured before the
generation units because of their offer prices, with only 4 MW
of TUS provided by the solar unit in node 7 around midday.
B. Case study 2: Peak load warning event
The 15th of January of 2018 was characterized by a strong
demand response due to a peak load warning event (PˆT = 1).
As in Case study 1, Table VI and Figure 5 are used to illustrate
the outcomes of the mechanisms.
The Sequential mechanism has not been included in Figure
5 as the flexibility dispatch is the same as in TSO-DSO pro-
curements. This is because the TSO and DSO service interests
do not coincide in time. The only difference in Figure 5 is
found between the dispatch of TDS in the upper right quadrant,
where the Retailer procures TDS alone between 17:00 and
18:00, and in the lower right quadrant where the DSO and the
TABLE VI
MECHANISMS RESULTS IN CASE STUDY 2
Sequential TSO-DSO-Ret TSO-DSO
DSO
Valuation (£) 13,027 13,027 13,027
Cost (£) -721 -1,228 -721
Cross Impact (£) - - -
Welfare (£) 12,307 11,800 12,307
TSO
Valuation (£) 18,131 18,131 18,131
Cost (£) -1,936 -1,936 -1,936
Cross Impact (£) - - -
Welfare (£) 16,195 16,195 16,195
Retailer
Valuation (£) 550,440 550,440 550,440
Cost (£) -1,014 -507 -1,014
Cross Impact (£) 488 - -
Welfare (£) 549,914 549,933 549,426
Totals Welfare (£) 578,416 577,928 577,928
Retailer procure the same services jointly. Such a difference
is due to an alignment of their procurement needs in the TSO-
DSO-Retailer mechanism (lower right quadrant), whereas in
the sequential mechanism Retailer relieves indirectly the needs
for TDS by DSO. The TSO services are limited to TDS
activation during the STOR morning window. The afternoon
does not require any STOR because the peak load demand
management relieves the reserve needs, therefore a conflict
between Retailer and TSO procurement is very unlikely to
happen. As seen in Table VI, the Retailer incurs entirely
the cost of the TDS procured in the TSO-DSO mechanism,
whereas the DSO and the Retailer share that cost in the
TSO-DSO-Retailer mechanism. The result of the TSO-DSO-
Retailer scheme suggests that some of the Retailer’s costs
will be incurred by the DSO, which will then be socialized
among all the distribution users. Such undesired effects and
the apparent absence of improvement in social welfare weaken
the interest in implementing this scheme. Moreover, as in Case
study 1, the Retailer profits from the cross impacts caused by
DSO imbalances in the Sequential mechanism.
In summary, Case study 1 reflects an important improvement
of the DSO and TSO welfare in the TSO-DSO mechanism
over the sequential procurement due to a share of cost in
the evening TDS and the avoided cross impact cost in the
midday TUS. Both case studies reflect the undesired cross
impacts on the Retailer. Finally, the inclusion of the Retailer
in the TSO-DSO-Retailer mechanism creates an undesirable
transfer of costs from the Retailer to the DSO in Case study
2. Therefore the co-ordinated TSO-DSO mechanism is found
to be the preferable choice.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes three types of market designs to activate
flexibility services embedded in the distribution network. The
flexibility is used by the TSO for operating reserve deploy-
ment, by the DSO for congestion services, and by Retailers
to set against peak-load network tariffs. For two selected
case study days in the British power system, simulating
these market designs revealed that the co-ordinated TSO-
DSO mechanism substantially increases the welfare of system
operators compared to the separate sequential mechanism.
The inclusion of the Retailer in the joint dispatch does not
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increase the total welfare. Thus, the analysis of two actual
operational days with a realistic model of local area con-
gestion provides persuasive and intuitive evidence to suggest
that the most effective co-ordination would be regulated co-
operative dispatch between network and system operators,
and a separate competitive market for Retailers. The results
discussed represent the operation of the British power system
and are therefore idiosyncratic in some of the operational
details, but the general principles could apply to other power
markets exhibiting similar business features among Retailers,
DSOs and TSOs. Furthermore, this formulation could be
extended to model other operations of DSOs, such as voltage
management, fault recovery, or island operation. As for the
TSO, the model could be extended to include interests in other
ancillary services, such as frequency response, or congestion
management in the transmission network.
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